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General Information
SATEN1 is an object-oriented web-based extraction
and belief revision engine. It runs on any computer
via a Java 1.1 enabled browser such as Netscape 4.
SATEN performs belief revision based on the AGM ap-
proach (Alchourro´n et al 85). The extraction and belief
revision reasoning engines operate on a user specified
ranking of information. One of the features of SATEN
is that it can be used to integrate mutually inconsistent
commensuate rankings into a consistent ranking.
General Description of the System
SATEN has two reasoning engines: a revision engine
and an extraction engine. Both engines operate on a
user-specified ranking of information.
The process of extraction involves the recovery of a
consistent ranking from an inconsistent ranking. Sev-
eral strategies are available for this process. Extraction
can be seen as a generalisation of Brewka’s work on
subtheories (Brewka 89). It is also related to Poole’s
work (Poole 88; Dubois et al 94).
Revision models the incorporation of new informa-
tion (a belief) into a knowledge base. The main diffi-
culty in modeling this process is that the incoming in-
formation may be inconsistent with the agent’s knowl-
edge base. Consequently, the agent must determine
the information to be relinquished before the new in-
formation can be accepted, if the agent is to maintain
a consistent knowledge base. There are several con-
structive definitions of belief revision based on various
preference relations over the agents knowledge. These
preference relations attempt to capture the relative im-
portance of information with respect to change. When
an agent is forced to give up beliefs in order to ac-
cept some new information then, if presented with a
choice, a response would be to choose to retain more
important information, like system laws and integrity
1SATEN a Sagacious Agent for Theory Extraction and
revisioN is available at http://cafe.newcastle.edu.au/saten
constraints, rather than contingent facts and default
facts.
SATEN is capable of:
• Theory Extraction
• Iterated Belief Revision
• Nonmonotonic Reasoning
• Possibilistic Reasoning
• Hypothetical Reasoning
Using combinations of these capabilities SATEN can
perform information integration/fusion on mutually in-
consistent commensurate knowledge bases and can cal-
culate Spohnian reasons (Spohn 83a).
SATEN currently implements the reasoning strate-
gies below based on a user specified ranking of beliefs
(logical formulae). A ranking can be specified as map-
ping from beliefs to [1,2,3,...] in which case the most
important information is given the lowest rank, i.e.
rank is inversely proportional to importance. Alter-
natively, beliefs can be ranked using degrees of belief
between 0 and 1 - the higher the degree the more im-
portant the information, in particular tautologies are
assigned 1, whilst inconsistencies and nonbeliefs are
given 0. SATEN can derive an ordinal ranking from a
set of specified degrees automatically, by toggling one
of the menu settings.
• Standard Adjustment (Williams 94a; Williams 95;
Williams 94b) is based on the standard epistemic
entrenchment construction (Ga¨rdenfors & Makinson
88) for Belief Revision.
• Maxi-Adjustment is based on maximal inertia
(Williams 97a). Maxi-adjustment proceeds from the
top of the ranking and moves down it rank by rank.
At each rank it deletes all the beliefs that are incon-
sistent with other beliefs at that rank and above.
• Hybrid Adjustment is a combination of standard
adjustment and maxi-adjustment (Williams 97a).
Adjustment is computationally “easier” than maxi-
adjustment, however the main shortcoming of ad-
justment is that it maintains beliefs only if there is an
explicit reason to keep them, whilst maxi-adjustment
removes beliefs only if there is an explicit reason
to remove them. Hybrid adjustment performs an
adjustment which computes the core beliefs to be
retained, and then it performs a maxi-adjustment
which is used to regather as many beliefs as possible
that were discarded during the adjustment phase.
• Global Adjustment is similar to a maxi-adjustment
except that it takes all beliefs in the ranking into
consideration when computing the minimally incon-
sistent subsets, instead of proceeding rank by rank.
It removes the least ranked beliefs ”causing” the in-
consistency.
• Linear Adjustment is similar to maxi-adjustment
except that it removes all the beliefs at ranks
which contain incosisitencies with beliefs above them
(Nebel 94). IF there is only one belief at each rank,
then linear and maxi-adjustment are identical.
• Quick Adjustment is identical to maxi-adjustment
except that rather than removing all beliefs it ran-
domly chooses a minimal number of beliefs from each
set of inconsistent beliefs in this way the inconsis-
tency is removed.
A number of examples are available via a dropdown
menu which highlight the different behaviour of the
strategies.
Methodology
An inherent difficulty that arises when trying to model
world states using the predicate calculus is that of con-
sistency. Under the rules of formal logic, anything
is derivable from a contradiction, hence it is imper-
ative that consistency of the model be maintained at
all times so that the agent acting on that model is able
to make sound decisions. However, it is not uncom-
mon in the realm of belief-based reasoning for newly
acquired information to be inconsistent with the cur-
rent set of beliefs. For instance, suppose that an agent
believes that Tweety is a bird, and that all birds can
fly. This agent subsequently discovers that, Tweety is a
penguin, and knowing that penguins can’t fly, will now
have to deal with the fact that this new information is
inconsistent with what it already believes.
It is clear that when this sort of situation arises,
the agent will need to select a set of beliefs to be re-
moved from its knowledge base in order to maintain
consistency in its knowledge base when the new be-
lief is inserted, thus allowing it to continue to reason
on the basis of its revised knowledge base. However,
the question arises: which beliefs should be removed?
Even in the above example, the removal of any sub-
set of the beliefs listed will make the new information
that Tweety is a penguin consistent, so the question
of which belief or set of beliefs to remove has no clear
answer.
Alchourro´n, Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson (Alchourro´n
et al 85; Alchourro´n & Makinson 82; Alchourro´n &
Makinson 85) investigated a set of rationality postu-
lates regarding theory change operators. These postu-
lates appear to capture much of what is required of an
ideal rational system of theory change. In particular,
they developed three primary classes of theory change
operators: expansion, contraction and revision. Ex-
pansions are deterministic, and can be expressed set-
theoretically, but it is well known that the logical prop-
erties of a body of information are not strong enough
to uniquely determine a revision or contraction opera-
tor. Consequently, some sort of preference order needs
to be imposed on the beliefs in the agent’s knowledge
base. This approach to Belief Revision has come to be
known as the AGM paradigm.
Two common models used to impose the preference
order required by the AGM paradigm on systems of be-
liefs are epistemic entrenchment orderings (Ga¨rdenfors
& Makinson 88) and systems of spheres (Grove 88). An
epistemic entrenchment ordering ranks the sentences
in the knowledge base, whereas a system of spheres
is a total preorder of the set of possible world states.
SATEN uses the epistemic entrenchment representa-
tion and uses the services of a full first order theorem
prover implemented in Java (Sims and Williams 97).
Revision of a system of spheres can be implemented via
a standard Database Management System (Williams
97b).
The implementation of revision in SATEN is
steeped in the AGM paradigm (Alchourro´n et al 85).
Ga¨rdenfors and Makinson’s (Ga¨rdenfors & Makin-
son 88) showed that an epistemic entrenchment can
uniquely determine how an agent will react to the pres-
sures of impinging information. Their construction is
an elegant theoretical result, and to use it as the foun-
dation for a computer-based implementation of belief
revision the following problems need to be addressed.
• Epistemic entrenchments order all the beliefs in the
underlying language. The underlying language may
be infinite in size, therefore a finite representation
for an epistemic entrenchment is required.
• A new knowledge base, rather than a new epistemic
entrenchment ordering is constructed. However from
a practical point of view developing a new entrench-
ment ranking is imperative because an implemen-
tation must have the capacity to perform iterated
revision.
An implementation of belief revision must propagate
an epistemic entrenchment ordering (or more precisely
its finite representation). SATEN overcomes the first
problem using a finite partial entrenchment ranking
(Williams 94a; Williams 97a) as the underlying repre-
sentation scheme, and it overcomes the second prob-
lem using transmutations (Spohn 88a; Williams 94b;
Williams 97a).
Applying the System
The user specifies a prioritised knowledge base. We
have found that for most applications the user-specified
ranking can be otained in a natural way during the
analysis and design phase (Williams 98).
The following guidelines for designing a ranking were
developed in (Williams 97a):
• Important information should be made explicit in
the ranking
• Information should be represented in its simplest
logical form
• Maximize the number of ranks, and minimise the
number of beliefs at each rank for better perfor-
mance
• Rankings should be as irredundant as possible
• Subsumption at the same rank should be avoided
• User specifies reasons
• Check the contraposition of reasons does not lead to
undesired behaviour
SATEN can revise first order theory bases. It uses
the services a Java first order theorem prover VADER
(Sims and Williams 97) to determine consequence re-
lations, and hence takes worst-case exponential time
in the number of formulae in the knowledge base to
compute even propositional revision. However, given
Horn input clauses, the system will use a Linear De-
scent algorithm for its deductions, resulting in linear
time efficiency. A number of strategies have been im-
plemented in this system : standard adjustment, maxi-
adjustment, hybrid adjustment, global adjustment, lin-
ear adjustment, and quick adjustment.
Theory extraction is related to belief revision and
uses an extraction operator is a map between epis-
temic entrenchment orderings which, given an incon-
sistent ranking, extracts from it some (in some sense)
maximal consistent ranking/theory base. Whilst ev-
ery extraction operator gives rise rather naturally to a
corresponding revision operator, it remains unknown
whether the converse is true. When SATEN performs
a revision, the internal behaviour is to add the new
belief to the base at an appropriate rank, and then to
perform a Theory Extraction, before normalising the
beliefs to achieve the revised theory base. The process
of normalisation converts any ranking into a partial
entrenchment ranking.
SATEN is capable of performing both Belief Revi-
sion and Theory Extraction on theory bases, and of
determining the degree of an arbitrary wff in it’s the-
ory base, and can normalize a ranked theory base. It
is also capable of automatically ranking the beliefs in
the theory base — the user has the option to view the
total order as a ranking (with the (0,1)-values of the en-
trenchments suppressed) although the rankings are al-
ways represented internally with (0,1)-values. Finally,
the user may specify whether new beliefs added to the
base without a rank should, by default, be placed at
the top of the ranking, or at the bottom. This feature
can be used when the rank of new information is un-
known. The most conservative approach would place
the new information without rank at the both of the
ranking.
Input Format
SATEN accepts any Predicate Calculus wff’s as input.
Variables in the predicate calculus must begin with a
capital letter, and contain only alphanumeric symbols
and underscores ( ). Constants have the same format
as variables, but must begin with a lower case letter.
Predicate and function names must comply with the
same format as variables and constants respectively,
but must be followed by a parenthesized list of argu-
ments separated by commas.
Input should be in fully parenthesised logic syntax
and should not contain spaces:
• Negation is a minus sign (-).
• Implication is an arrow composed of a minus sign
and a greater than sign (−>). Note no space between
the two symbols.
• Conjunction is an ampersand (&).
• Disjunction is a pipe (|).
• The universal quantifier is an asterisk (*).
• The existential quantifier is an exclamation mark (!).
• Constants must begin with lower-case letters.
• Variables with upper-case letters.
• Functions start with lower-case.
• Propositional statements start with lower-case.
• First Order Predicates begin with upper-case.
Expression grouping is with parentheses, as is func-
tion (and predicate) argument list demarkation. User
input should not include any double underscores ( ) as
these are used by the program to tag system-generated
variables and skolem functions.
Example input format:
*X(Psychopathic(X)| Emotional(X))
-null
hopes&dreams
*X(!Y(Mother(X,Y)))
!Z(EatsChocolate(Z)−>Happy(Z))
*Y(-Income(Y)−>-Loan(Y))
We can encode ” “For all X there exists a Y such
that Y is the mother of X , and for all Y , if Y is the
daughter of Ben’s maternal grandmother, then Y is
Ben’s mother, or Y is Ben’s aunt.” using the following
sentence:
(∗X(!Y (M(X,Y )))&(∗Y (D(MGM(ben), Y )−>
(M(ben, Y )|A(ben, Y )))
whereX and Y are variables,M(X,Y ) is a predicate of
two variables with name M , MGM(X) is a function of
one variable with name MGM , and ben is a constant.
Strategies
The standard adjustment strategy finds the largest cut
of the inputs to SATEN that is consistent with the
incomming information, and keeps this as the result
of the revision. This is quite fast, but removes alot
of beliefs from the theory base in comparison to the
other strategies because as shown in (Williams 97a)
the independence of beliefs must be explicitly specified
in the ranking.
The maxi-adjustment strategy looks at each individ-
ual rank in the belief set, and removes the union of all
subsets S of the beliefs on that rank having the prop-
erties
1. S is inconsistent with the union of the incomming
information and all the information ranked higher
in the base than S; and
2. no proper subset of S satisfies 1.
This strategy keeps many of the beliefs in the theory
base, but is also quite slow as it has to examine all
subsets of each rank. Performance is improved if the
agent is more discerning. our algorithm is anytime
(Williams 97a) so the longer the agent has to revise
the better the result.
The hybrid adjustment strategy represents a com-
bination of the standard adjustment and maxi-
adjustment strategies. When revising with a, hybrid
adjustment first finds every belief b in the base such
that −a|b is in the base, and is at the same rank as
−a (this is the adjustment step — it is removing every
belief that “explicitly” fails to be a consequence of the
cut above −a), and then performs a maxi-adjustment
on what is left. So in other words maxi-adjustment is
used to recoup as much of the ranking as the time set
aside for the revision permits.
This strategy is comparable to maxi-adjustment
with regard to the number of beliefs retained, and
though somewhat faster on average, has the same
worst-case time expenditure as the maxi-adjustment
procedure.
The global adjustment strategy behaves exactly as
maxi-adjustment does, but acting under the assump-
tion that all beliefs have the same rank. This strategy
is quite slow, and is not as parsimonious in what it re-
moves as maxi-adjustment, but is highly intuitive with
respect to the set of beliefs removed (without refer-
ence to their ranks). It comes as close as possible to
eliminating the need for a ranking.
The linear adjustment strategy (Nebel 94)looks at
the successive cuts of the theory-base and, at every
rank at which the cut is inconsistent, removes the en-
tire rank from the base. This is quite time-efficient,
and keeps more beliefs in the base than standard ad-
justment, but, unlike hybrid adjustment and maxi-
adjustment, is fairly ad-hoc about the beliefs to be
kept in the theory base.
The quick adjustment strategy is an attempt to cap-
ture the judiciousness of maxi-adjustment without the
associated time expenditure. Once a given rank of be-
liefs is discovered to cause a contradiction, quick ad-
justment begins adding beliefs from the left end of that
rank until a contradiction is discovered. It then re-
moves these beliefs, one at a time, keeping track of
which ones eliminate the contradiction when they are
removed. It is these “culprit” beliefs that are then
removed from the theory base. This process is then
iterated. This strategy has the advantage of improv-
ing performance by reducing the amount of processing
at each rank, and also emulates the output of maxi-
adjustment much of the time. However, its behaviour
depends upon the order of the inputs on a given level
of the theory base, and hence is somewhat ad hoc. The
system could be easily extended to generate more than
one ranking and used to perform credulous reasoning.
Instead of randomly choosing an alternative, all alter-
native revised rankings could be created.
Other Options
SATEN implements three additional (optional) strate-
gies that interact with the various Belief Revision
strategies outlined above. These strategies are sub-
sumption removal, recovery, and nuclear revision. Of
these three, the second two are appropriate with any
belief revision strategy, but subsumption removal can-
not be used in conjunction with the standard adjust-
ment strategy. This is the only type of nuclear re-
vision currently implemented. Other approaches like
attributing half-lifes to individual beliefs will be avail-
able in the next version of SATEN.
Using subsumption removal ensures that any strat-
egy which must choose from a set of beliefs to remove
will preferrentially remove beliefs that are subsumed by
the incomming belief. For example, maxi-adjustment
will look amongst the set of beliefs it was going to
remove for the subset that are subsumed by the in-
comming belief. If there are none, it will proceed as
before, but if there are some, it will throw them away
first, and then check again for consistency. If the result
is still not consistent, the maxi-adjustment algorithm
is run again on the remaining beliefs.
The recovery option ensures that the recovery pos-
tulate is satisfied by the revisions. This is achieved by,
rather than removing a belief b, replacing it with the
disjunction b|a where a is the new belief. The only
time we do not do this is if b|a is a tautology.
The concept of nuclear revision models the fact that
beliefs that are not constantly reinforced tend to be-
come less substantial to an intelligent agent. When
nuclear revision is enabled, the user will be asked for a
half-life. This is the constant factor by which the en-
trenchment of every belief in the base drops after each
operation on the theory base. Thus, if the half-life were
set at 0 · 5, then the entrenchment of each belief in the
theory base would be halved after each operation.
Examples
SATEN has a substantial example menu intended to in-
dicate the correct input form for SATEN, and demon-
strate SATEN’s capabilities, but also to illustrate the
differences between the various belief revision strate-
gies that SATEN implements. These examples are bro-
ken into three categories: propositional, predicate, and
contrast of strategies.
The first of these indicates the correct input and be-
haviour of SATEN when presented with propositional
inputs only. Under these conditions, SATEN tends to
be somewhat more efficient than in the predicate case
for the reasons outlined in the VADER hyperbook in
the section on performance issues.
The second set of examples indicate SATEN’s be-
haviour with the more general input form of the Pred-
icate Calculus, specifically, its behaviour when quan-
tifiers and variables are involved. The differences are
essentially at the theorem prover level, and are opaque
to SATEN itself.
The third set of examples are designed to indicate
differences in behaviour between the different revision
strategies. This is done for two reasons: the first is
to highlight the salient points that make each strategy
desirable or undesirable in comparison to the others;
the second, which is, to some degree subsumed by the
first, is to demonstrate that there actually is a differ-
ence between each pair of strategies, and that these dif-
ferences do not require overly sophisticated examples
to demonstrate — in particular, propositional calculus
is sufficient, and it is possible to get pairwise distinct
behaviour from the strategies on an example with just
nine beliefs and four distinct ranks.
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